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Introduction 
This article seeks to briefly explore not so much the substance of 
English—and later British—legal transfers in India, but rather their 
procedural aspect, their raison d’être. The transplantation of English 
law—albeit modified to sometimes fit local realities within the 
Subcontinent—was indeed hardly a given, but on the contrary a heavily 
discussed topic; and irrespective of whether these transfers were 
championed or challenged, they always sought to be legally justified, be 
it on a theoretical, anthropological or historiographical level.   
Robert Travers (2007) was among the first to comprehensively 
present the evolution of these ideological imperial legal discourses 
throughout the eighteenth century, while Nicholas Dirks (2008) pursued 
this venture within the 1800s. Similarly, much has been written on the 
colonial legal order and its link to the advent and spread of legal 
positivism worldwide throughout the nineteenth century, and how India 
and other colonies became a testing ground upon which the foundations 
of modern European legal orders were in fact constructed (see for 





The existence of such heated debates as to how and whether legal 
transfers could or even should be conducted overseas has thus been 
well documented. Nonetheless they often have been portrayed under 
the paradigm of an experiment: that of trial and error, constant adap-
tations to new realities, differing and often competing orientalist and 
personal projections, and irremediably conclude to their apparent hap-
hazard applications and results (Benton & Ford 2016).       
However, as a matter of doctrine, the theory of legal transfers within 
the Common Law tradition has been surprisingly consistent since 
Edward Coke’s opinion in the famous Calvin’s case of 1608 (77 E. R. 
377). Equally, the orientalist projections that underpinned the under-
standing of the Mughal monarchy, or indeed that of princely states in 
India, have also been fairly constant since François Bernier’s travel log 
(1916) in the seventeenth century: that of a despotic monarch, allodial 
owner of the lands upon which the nobles were only granted conditional 
use, subject to expropriation and escheat. This begs the question as to 
why this impression of haphardness remains, if all the protocols and 
processes had been settled from a very early stage. 
It is contented that the answer lies not in India, but rather in England. 
The evolution of legal transfers in India were imperial in scope but 
remained very provincial as to their justification, and could ultimately 
be traced back to Britain’s own legal evolution as to the concept of 
sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty and the extent of sovereign 
power is indeed central to legal transplants’ justification, and the 
necessary starting point upon which they can be processed. It is thus 
not mere coincidence that the utilitarians have made this question the 
cornerstone of their legal theory (Hart 1967), before embarking on a 
unprecedented string legal transfers in India in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Stokes 1959). It is also unsurprising that they 
reserved their more scathing critiques to Common Law’s conception of 
sovereignty—or lack thereof—and of its difficult localisation in the British 
legal and imperial contexts. Indeed, whether it sat with the King of 
England through its charters, the commercial companies to which they 
were granted, the British parliament or even the local Indian rulers, the 
localisation of sovereignty in the early modern period is hard to pinpoint. 
 Irrespective, it always remained a very English affair, where sover-
eignty was not theorised in conjunction to the formation of an abstract 
concept of the state, but rather as a linking mechanism between the 
King as allodial owner of the land, and parliament representing the 
"commonwealth" as the sole source of law within the said land. A linking 
mechanism, empirical and feudal in nature, which kept on swinging 





at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This conceptual ambiguity in 
the early modern period was not however an impediment to British 
colonial ventures, but on the contrary a blessing for the commercial 
companies, which quickly learned to benefit from it.  
  As such, this particular constitutional fluidity has had a direct impact 
on how the East India Company (here in after EIC or the Company) 
conceived its role in India. Indeed, the EIC did not so much seek 
dominium of the land, but rather imperium on it: how laws should both 
be administered, eventually changed and indeed transferred. It pro-
jected unto India the English constitutional debates and realities of the 
day, with and despite appearances, very little consideration for Indian 
ones. As such, it is advanced that the Company did not seek sovereignty 
in India, but rather to represent the Indian "commonwealth" by mirror-
ing the evolution the latter gained in England during the same period, 
including the ability to ultimately choose which crown would suit its 
interests best. 
The East India Company’s legal standing in the seventeenth 
century 
Sovereignty in Britain: a fluid legal concept 
In order to understand the EIC’s legal standing in India, one must first 
keep in mind the particular legal order of England—and then Britain—in 
the early modern period, and its radical distinction from its continental 
counterparts, especially in relation to the concept of property. 
Whereas in France—as one of the most prominent counter-example— 
the state was formed by severing the ties it had with physical possession 
in the creation of an abstract concept of property, England founded its 
legal edifice by establishing possessory remedies through the King’s 
courts and then the court of chancery. The emphasis on possession as 
the physical detention of the land entailing a right to property is deeply 
rooted in the Common Law tradition, but also in the differing political 
challenges faced by the King of England compared to his French counter-
part. Whilst the latter wished to re-claim possession over territory he 
did not detain, the King of England wished to re-claim property rights 
over land he already owned. 
Indeed, the original feudal system imported from Normandy had 
rapidly diverged from its continental model in numerous ways: first 
through the establishment of remedies which directly favoured posses-
sion as means to prove ownership, second on the survival of customs 
on manorial grounds which created a distinct class of tenure extraneous 





ultimately led to by-pass most feudal incidents and led to the creation 
of equity (Buck 1990). 
The individual’s legal standing in England was one based on empirical 
realities of possession linked to "use", and not on the neo-Roman 
inspired abstract concept of property. In turn, this led to differing legal 
bases upon which political representation and thus sovereignty was 
established. Whereas in France sovereignty would progressively be 
theorised as an abstract legal notion embodied in the King (property 
leading to a right to possess), in England it is the "commonwealth" 
represented in parliament who will grant the King a right to sovereignty 
(possession leading to property rights). 
In England, the division between the monarch’s two bodies is almost 
absent until the sixteenth century.1 It is the emergence of a legal 
capacity granted to individuals represented in parliament as "common-
wealth" which will progressively shift the origin of the King’s power from 
patrimonial allodial owner, to that of embodying the "crown" as a legal 
representative of the political body that is the "nation". Hence, whereas 
in France the King through the conceptualisation of the state embodies 
the "nation" as both "regime" and "commonwealth"; in England the 
"nation" will remain composed of two distinct entities, parliament as 
"commonwealth" and the King as the embodiment of its regime.2 
The legal historian Frederic Maitland (1900) will trace the origin of 
this distinction within Edward Coke’s transposition of ecclesiastical law 
to the secular frame in his Institutes in the seventeenth century. Indeed, 
the two capacities—or bodies—of the King were incorporated within one 
single physical person (corporation sole), and not within an abstract 
legal personality (corporation aggregate), such as the continental 
concept of state encompassing both regime and commonwealth. If the 
former is inherently linked to the physical body of its holder and may be 
transferred upon his death, it still lacks the continuity attached to the 
fictitious legal personality of the latter. It is true that the "body politic" 
of the monarch will increasingly be referenced as an abstract "crown" 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but as Maitland 
(1901: 136) remarks: 'We might have thought that the introduction of 
phrases which gave the king an immortal as well as a mortal body would 
have transformed this part of the law.3 But no. The consequences of the 
old principle had to be picked off one after another by statute'. 
The emergence of utilitarian thought at the turn of the nineteenth 
century alongside the advent of legal positivism, notably through the 
John Austin’s command theory (Austin 1832), has nevertheless blurred 
the lines further, notably in its frontal attack on Blackstone’s notion of 





able to achieve its goal in supplanting the traditional empirical notion of 
sovereignty with an abstract counterpart. Nevertheless, it did contribute 
to its re-localisation within the ambit of what came as close as a 
corporation aggregate. It is indeed the parliament which, through the 
Georgian era, will increasingly take over the attributes of government 
and regime within a contractualist perspective, incorporating the crown 
within its ambit and, as the nineteenth century unfolded, came to mono-
polise the use of term "sovereignty" up to this day.     
Sovereignty in British colonies: an appropriation of land, but not 
necessarily of law 
Irrespective, the continued dichotomy between crown and common-
wealth in the legal conceptualisation of the English and then British state 
will endure, and will have lasting implications to the claims of sover-
eignty and that of legal transfers during Britain’s colonial expansion. 
The first consequence relates to the appropriation of land per se 
which, although falling into the dominium (hence the term "Dominion") 
of the crown, will not automatically fall under the English (as common-
wealth) legal imperium. In other words, only the crown travels. 
Consequently, despite the merger of the Scottish and English crowns 
under James I, the King will never be able to legally unite both Kingdoms 
due to the parliaments’ resistance in their conception of the monarch as 
having only a political capacity granted to him by the Common Law. 
Despite the attempts to change the myth underpinning law (whether by 
invoking the legendary lineage of King Fergus who "gave" law to 
barbarous Scots, or as being God’s chosen leader), the English legal 
system would not depart from its practical and empirical roots and stray 
along the concept of an abstract state with a distinct legal personality, 
which would then be embodied by the King. 
Subsequently, the laws that would apply in newly conquered terri-
tories, although inspired by the English legal system, could not (and in 
fact will not) simply be transplanted from England, but rather will take 
their source in the "commonwealth" of those territories, provided its 
inhabitants were deemed to have a legal personality of their own. In 
order to assess such legal personality, Coke is again the main reference, 
who through his opinion in Calvin’s case will advance that a change in 
sovereignty over a land does not automatically entail the abrogation of 
pre-existing laws and the wholesale legal transplant of English statutes, 
provided the inhabitants were Christian. This solution will be followed by 
Lord Mansfield more than a hundred years later in Campbell v. Hall 





Christian affiliation which he deemed 'absurd […] and in all probability 
arose from the mad enthousiasm of the Croisades' (ibid.: 1047f.). 
Nonetheless, despite the increasing toleration of non-Christians within 
the fold of legal subjects, the main criteria to assess the legal capacity 
of an individual was still entrenched within seventeenth century legal 
thinking and most particularly that of John Locke who, through his 1690 
Second Treatise on Civil Government (1986), will link the concept of 
legal personality with the "use" of the land, following an all but classical 
possessory notion of property, directly in line with the feudal English 
system (Schmitt 2003: 47). The agriculturalist theory that ensued will 
serve as the basis to deny the recognition of Native American law, first 
and foremost that of property (Armitage 2004), paving the way to 
English legal transfers in the Americas, but also in Australia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.    
Relationship between the crown and the EIC 
However unlike in North America and other res nullius territories, India 
had struck the imagination of Europe as having proper—albeit imper-
fect—regime (Raiswell 2003). Similarly, and unlike American first 
nations, which were stripped of their legal personality for not "using" the 
land upon which they dwelled, Indians had been considered as a distinct 
"commonwealth", but most importantly still under the sovereignty of 
their local rulers, of which the EIC only sought extra-territorial rights for 
their own servants. At first, the English crown did not even seek 
dominium over Indian land, let alone imperium over it. Indeed, it was 
not its first goal at the turn of the seventeenth century. As Courtenay 
Ilbert (1915: 9) points out: 'the annexations of the sixteenth century 
were annexations not of territory, but of trading-grounds'. 
It is thus unsurprising that the first charter granted to the EIC in 1600 
did not refer to "untilled" or "not yet cultivated or planted" land, contrary 
to the ones given to the Lords Proprietor of Carolina in 1629 and 1663. 
Similarly, the Elizabethan charter only provided for the enactment of by-
laws for the good governance of the EIC’s own affairs. The limited 
jurisdiction and legislative powers the Company received were in fact 
from Indian rulers themselves, through treatises according to proto-
international law. Hence, a letter from Jahangir (r. 1605-27) to James I 
(r. 1603-25), following the latter’s demands through Thomas Roe’s 
embassy will state: 
I have given my general command to all my kingdoms and ports 
of my Dominions to receive all the merchants of the English nation 
as the subjects of my friend, that in what place so-ever they choose 





and safety […] and in what City so-ever they shall have residence, 
I have commanded all my Governors and Captains to give them 
freedom answerable to their own desires.4 
The promised settlement would later be confirmed through a farman 
(grant, edict) by the Gujarati Nawwab, relating to Surat: 
The house of Cojah Hassen Allee in Surrat, with the garden, stable, 
and other conveniences thereunto belonging, shall be let them 
lease for the term of seven years immediately following the date 
hereof […] 11. They shall quietly and freely exercise their own 
religion, wear arms for their defence and execute justice on their 
own people, though the offence bee done to a Mussellman.5 
Other similar arrangements would follow suit through the establishment 
of factories in Madras (1639) and Calcutta (1690). 
The situation however changed upon the transfer of Bombay to King 
Charles II as dowry for his marriage with Catherine of Braganza in 1661. 
For the first time, the EIC was now in a position to bypass Indian rulers, 
the English crown being not only in possession, but most importantly 
having property over an Indian territory. Coke’s jurisprudence would 
here apply fully and is reflected in the 1661 Charter stating that justice 
would now be administered 'according the Laws of this Kingdom 
[England]', paving the way for wholesale legal transfers, with limited 
exceptions for the Christians present, namely Portuguese.  
However the Company was well aware of the English legal framework 
and was determined not to be sidestepped in its claim to represent the 
Indian commonwealth. That the crown had dominium over Bombay was 
beyond dispute, but imperium was another affair. Projecting the debates 
within the English parliament following the restoration of Charles II (r. 
1660-85) to the English throne and the increasing limitations of his 
sovereign powers, a subtle change of language was thus operated upon 
Bombay’s lease to the EIC within the 1668 Charter for justice now to be 
administered 'as may be agreeable to the laws of this Kingdom', thus 
paving the way for the EIC to legislate on its own. The subsequent enact-
ment of "Company laws" may have been qualified by Gerald Aungiers 
(president of Surat and governor of Bombay) as 'an excellent abridge-
ment of the [laws of England]', they nevertheless were quite different 
(Fawcett 1934: 54). Aungiers himself, in the opening speech of the 
Bombay Court of Judicature in 1672, would emphasise the evasive con-
cept of justice over the substantive law that would be administered to 
the King’s new subjects, as well as of the conceptual dichotomy 
pertaining to English sovereignty in classifying these "subjects" as being 





The Inhabitants of this Island consist of several nations and 
Religions to wit -, English, Portuguese and other Christians, Moores 
[Muslims], and Jentues [Hindus], but you, when you sit in this seat 
of Justice and Judgement, must look upon them with one single 
eye as I do, without distinction of Nation or Religion, for they are 
all his Majesties and the Honourable Company’s subjects as the 
English are, and have all an equal title and right to Justice and you 
must do them all Justice.6 
The establishment of admiralty courts, made possible through the 1683 
Charter followed the same logic: the recognition of the King’s sover-
eignty alongside an insistence on the Company to represent and to 
legislate for the Indian commonwealth, mirroring the English evolving 
constitutional framework. The history of admiralty courts in seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century India have seldom been studied (with notably 
exceptions such as Das 1970; Crump 1980; Fawcett 1934), and more-
over been branded as 'near universal failure' (Frass 2011: 43). However, 
if indeed admiralty courts have not had the success and longevity of the 
Mayor Court system established in 1726, they nonetheless do point to 
certain interesting features of English sovereignty in India. 
A lot of focus has been put on the personal history of Dr. John St. 
John, the first professionally trained lawyer in civil law appointed to India 
in 1684, whose relations with the Company collapsed due to its self-
appointment as Chief Justice of Bombay and his reliance on English 
statutes, as well as his personal enmities with EIC officials (Derrett 
1980). His summary dismissal in 1687 and the Company later creating 
a Mayor Court in Madras under its own seal (1688)—and not that of the 
King’s—should not however be interpreted as a defiance to the crown’s 
sovereignty, but rather as a move to precisely prevent English law to be 
directly applied within the Subcontinent, as the EIC reminded its jus-
tices, first among which St. John: 
We understand you have an antient Statute booke at Bombay; but 
you are under a great mistake, if you think our Statute booke be 
law in Bombay, none of our Statutes or Acts of Parliament as we 
have formerly told you, extending further then the Kingdome of 
England, the Dominion of Wales, and the Town of Barwick upon 
Tweed. […] by his present Majesty’s Charter, and the last Charter 
of our late Sovereign, you are to govern our people there, being 
subject to us under his Majesty by the Law Martiall and the Civill 
Law, which is only proper to India.7 
A pattern then emerges as to the singular position of the EIC within—or 
rather outside—the English imperial system, that of representing a 





in one of the Company’s resolution in 1688 (cited in Ilbert 1915: 23, 
emphasis added): 
The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as 
our trade; ‘tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents 
may interrupt our trade; ‘tis that must make us a nation in India; 
without that we are but a great number of interlopers, united by 
His Majesty’s royal charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power 
thinks it their interest to prevent us; and upon this account it is 
that the wise Dutch, in all their general advices that we have seen, 
write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and 
military policy, warfare, and the increase of their revenue, for one 
paragraph they write concerning trade. 
In other words, the Company ventured to re-create the English consti-
tutional legal framework in India, albeit under its own terms. The aim of 
the Company, of which one can see the origins within the establishment 
of mayor courts in the late seventeenth century, is not to replace the 
sovereign, but rather to be in the position to ensure the monopoly on 
the conception and administration of law within the Indian territories 
under its control. 
The East India Company’s standing in the eighteenth century 
In this respect, the seventeenth century EIC did not have much to worry 
about Westminster’s oversight, even during Oliver Cromwell’s interlude 
at the head of the English Commonwealth. The Company on the contrary 
benefited from the absolutist tendencies of Charles I before him, and of 
Charles II’s bitter fight with parliament following the restoration.  
Indeed, the EIC’s monopoly of trade in the East Indies depended 
solely on the King’s charters, independent of the English parliament’s 
purview, and the possession of Indian territory that had been achieved 
through the conclusion of multiple treatises as an agent of the crown, 
and not as agent of the English "commonwealth" represented in West-
minster. 
Losing such status however and becoming an agent of parliament 
would eventually impede its claim to administer and create law, for this 
time it would not be solely the crown that travelled but the entire British 
nation, and with it its laws. To avoid this fate, the EIC will thus try to 
establish alternative claims to sovereignty in order to keep its legislative 







The EIC losing its royal prerogatives and looking for alternatives 
The EIC’s change of tactics followed closely the "Glorious Revolution" of 
1688 and the subsequent empowerment of parliament to the detriment 
of the King, a tendency which dramatically increased at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century and the debates surrounding the succession of 
Queen Anne (r. 1702-14), of which Westminster tried (and arguably 
achieved) to control with the accession of George I (r. 1714-27), inaugu-
rating an era leading up to parliamentary sovereignty. 
In England, some traders were quick to latch on this evolving consti-
tutional landscape and established a "new" Company, challenging the 
"old" one on the basis that a monopoly on trade was beyond royal 
prerogatives and could not be simply granted through a royal charter 
and necessitated an act of parliament. The bitter fight that ensued 
between both entities would finally be settled through their somewhat 
forced merger in 1708. However, the newly founded EIC was aware of 
the growing parliamentary control it would have to face, which was ulti-
mately translated in the Charter of 1726, creating Mayor courts under 
the King’s seal and most importantly enshrining the administration of 
English law within Presidency territories (namely Calcutta, Bombay and 
Madras) previously acquired by the "old" EIC in the name of the King. 
The Company thus started to look beyond the British King’s agency, 
which had now been subdued by parliamentary control within those 
territories. 
It is with the aforementioned framework in mind that one can better 
understand Robert Clive’s choice after the battle of Buxar (1764) to seek 
the diwani (administrative jurisdiction) of Bengal, Bihar and Odisha from 
the Mughal Emperor, with the added bonus of personally benefiting of 
the grant of tax free jagir (feudal land) within those territories. Indeed, 
only through a direct treaty between the EIC and the Mughal allodial 
owner (as he was then considered), could the former replicate the British 
constitutional framework, whilst by-passing the British parliament 
entirely. 
The subsequent dual system—or diarchy—whereby English law would 
apply within the Presidencies through the King’s courts and Islamic law 
within mufassal (also spelled Mofussil: provincial or rural district) 
territory through Company courts, installed the EIC as a de facto if not 
de jure Indian "parliament" within the Mofussil, controlling the admini-
stration of law but also its creation and reform under the nominal 
sovereignty of the Mughal monarch in lieu of the British King. A "parlia-
ment" which nonetheless only took the organisational features of a 
cabinet in the form of a Supreme Council, and within which no Indian 





This change of sovereignty spurred lively debates in the late eigh-
teenth century, most notably between Warren Hastings, Governor 
General of Bengal (1773-85), and Philipp Francis, member of the 
Supreme Council. Indeed, Hastings defended the local Mughal institu-
tions of justice, for which he devised a specific plan8 with the aim of 
reforming them to suit the Company’s needs, such as his plan to instate 
himself as the judge of last resort in criminal matters in lieu of the 
Mughal Nawwab (governor).9 He also protected the predominance of 
Islamic law as the lex loci of India, justifying exceptions for the appli-
cation of Hindu law within Islamic jurisprudence itself: 
The Mahomedan government […] has left their [the Hindus] 
privileges untouched […]. I presume my lord, if this assertion can 
be proved, you will not deem it necessary that I should urge any 
argument in defence of their right to possess those benefits under 
a British and Christian administration which the bigotry of the 
Mahomedan government has never denied them.10 
Francis on the other hand favoured another interpretation of the "Mughal 
Constitution", which on the contrary refuted the predominance of 
Islamic law and with it the "feudal fiction" of the Mughal Emperor’s 
sovereignty as the allodial owner of the land. He favoured an empirical 
legal system, coined "country government", where laws stem, much like 
within the English manorial system, from the tradition of their local 
usage under the guise of the zamindari (manor, estate, lordship), which 
were in their great majority Hindu (Francis 1782: 72). As such, he 
considered that nothing impeded the British King to claim dominium 
over Bengal, albeit in a separate capacity from that of Britain and thus 
outside Westminster’s purview, keeping in mind that such sovereignty 
would not lead to the imperium of English law, but quite the opposite. 
Irrespective of the apparent differences between both conceptions, 
they both aimed at establishing a distinctive sovereign in India, separate 
from the British one, albeit incorporated within the same person for 
Francis. However, in doing so, they nonetheless continued to rely on the 
English framework distinguishing the sources of law from its admini-
stration; dominium from imperium; crown from commonwealth. In 
regard to the question of legal transfers from England to India, it could 
then be said they pursued, despite different avenues, the same 
continuous goal from the seventeenth century onwards: establishing the 
Company as the sole representative and legislator of the Indian "com-
monwealth".  
As such, and far from inventing of a novel legal system, both men are 
at the core following the classical Common Law doctrine in relation to 





the imperial context by Lord Mansfield in Campbell v. Hall and 
summarised for India by the orientalist (and 1783-94 judge at the 
Calcutta Supreme Court) William Jones, for whom 'the laws of the 
natives must be preserved inviolate; but the learning and vigilance of 
the English judge must be a check upon the native interpreters' (Cannon 
1957: 188, emphasis in the original). 
Following both Francis and Hasting’s demise from Indian affairs, the 
Cornwallis Code of 179311 struck a balance between both these 
conceptions. Its main architect, John Shore, in a legal advice presented 
to the Supreme Council of Bengal, did not go as far as to question the 
Mughal Emperor’s sovereignty. However, he did base the latter’s exis-
tence on an empirical fact rather than on purely legal grounds, and 
further justified the reform of revenue collection on the observation that 
'[the] constitution of the Mughal Empire, despotic in its principle, 
arbitrary and irregular in its practice, renders it sometimes almost im-
possible to discriminate between power and principle, fact and right' and 
proposed a system that would be based on 'those usages which have 
subsisted for the greatest length of time, with the fewest variations and 
infringements'.12 In conveying the notion of "use", Shore not only 
projects English legal history within the Indian context, but also hints at 
increasing the contractual nature of the EIC’s conception of sovereignty. 
Indeed, in putting forward the idea of recognition of rights rather than 
their sole observation and ascertainment, the EIC was establishing 
itself—mirroring in that regard Britain’s parliament—as sole decider over 
which it may confer them to. As Westminster acted through statutes in 
order to frame the King’s prerogatives, the EIC used treaties and sanad 
(deed) to recognise the sovereignty of local rulers independently to that 
of the Mughal emperor. A political as well as a legal policy which would 
be championed most notably by Francis Rawdon-Hastings, Governor 
General of India between 1813 and 1823, who famously and continuous-
ly addressed the Mughal emperor as only the King of Delhi, and whose 
greatest achievement may have been to coronation of the Nawwab of 
Awadh as an independent monarch in 1819, declaring on that occasion 
that: 
He (the King of Oude) now holds his dominions in independent 
sovereignt; as Nawaub he exercised only a delegated sway, which 
the British Government, as representing that of Delhi, had the right 
to resume at its own discretion. Names are sometimes as real as 
things, and the King of Oude is not for any purpose the same as 
the Nawaub Vizier. (in Hale 1857: 65)         
The policy will endure, its framework leading to the concept of "para-





1858, albeit in a separate capacity than that of the British crown per se. 
Irrespective, the concept will follow that of its British roots as a 
"corporation sole" who would continue to be legally ill defined, its own 
theorists readily admitting as much (Lee-Warner 1910; Holdsworth 
1930) and the Butler committee specifically formed to define it acknow-
ledging in their report: 'We have endeavoured, as others before us have 
endeavoured, to find some formula which will cover the exercise of 
paramountcy, and we have failed, as others before have failed, to do so' 
(Butler 1929: 31). 
The conceptual vagueness that surrounded the person of the sover-
eign in India was never however an impediment to the Company. What 
mattered the most was the "exercise" of sovereignty, which in Britain 
had shifted in the early nineteenth century to Westminster, and that the 
Company was seeking to reproduce independently within the Subconti-
nent. But in order to do so, it still relied on the aforementioned classical 
notions of Common Law, consisting of an independent legal standing as 
a "body politic" and the recognition of a pre-existing law to administer. 
However, already by the end of the eighteenth century, both of these 
aspects were under threat.    
The EIC’s loss of "parliamentary" representation of the Indian 
"commonwealth" 
The Company—which had enjoyed a sui generis status since 1708—will 
first pass directly under the control of Parliament through the Regulating 
Act 1773 (13 Geo 3 C 63). Although the latter’s implications were not 
immediately foretold, they would however rapidly come to light through 
several decisions from the Supreme Court of Calcutta, which latched on 
the possibility to extend British jurisdiction within Mofussil territory. If 
the Nandkumar case of 1775 (1776) is best known for leading to the 
downfall of Warren Hastings, and the Cossijurah case of 1779 (Jain 
1952: 107-11) for forcing Westminster to limit the powers of the 
Supreme Court outside Presidency territory through the Amending Act 
1781 (21 Geo 3 C 65), it was however the Patna Case in 1779 (1780) 
which will have the more lasting effects on the legal standing of the 
Company in regards to its claim of independent administration of the 
Mofussil.13  
Whereas the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over diwani territory within 
this case would be invalidated by the Amending Act 1781, the argument 
put forward by Chief Justice Elijah Impey (in office 1774-83) will 
nevertheless have lasting consequences. The latter would indeed justify 
the court’s jurisdiction precisely on the fact that the Company being 





power to others through its Company courts (delegatus non potest 
delegare) to "native" (in this case Muslim) law officers. Although he 
would not go as far as to follow George Bogle (Commissioner of the Law 
Suits within the Company’s Supreme Council) in his assessment that the 
grant of diwani was itself invalid, he nonetheless enshrined the concep-
tion that the Company could no longer be considered an agent of the 
British King nor that of the Mughal emperor, but a creation of 
Westminster, which ultimately was the one to represent the Indian 
"commonwealth", which would be confirmed years later through the 
Charter Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will 4 C 85), notably in precluding the Company 
for creating legal institutions under its own seal. 
The EIC could nevertheless still cling unto the long-standing doctrine 
precluding wholesale legal transfers from England to inhabited territo-
ries, which it was in a unique position to administer, be it as the agent 
of the British parliament. Indeed, even though Mughal sovereignty 
would be deemed having passed onto the British (as a matter of fact) 
by the Privy Council in its decision Mayor of Lyons v. E. I. Company 
(1836, 1 Moore P. C. Cases 175), the latter would still uphold the prece-
dent that no substantive law had been transplanted following this trans-
fer of sovereignty. 
 It was however to be settled following the Lex Loci Report (House of 
Commons 1842) by the first Indian Law Commission of 1840, which 
deemed that there were no lex loci in India (re-instating William Bolts 
(1772) critique of Clive’s expansionism and invalidating the grant of 
diwani on the fact that the "Constitution of the Mogul Empire" simply did 
not exist). The commissioners followed in that regard the logical 
consequence of the 1773 Act, as interpreted in the Patna case precluding 
"native" law officers to be directly delegated the administration of justice 
by the Company. They indeed concluded that under such framework, 
Islamic law—which was still deemed to be the law of the land before the 
transfer of sovereignty (see for instance Galloway 1832: 12)—was 
inoperable as 'according to its own principles, [it] can only be adminis-
tered by Mahomedan judges and Mahomedan arbitrators, upon the 
testimony of Mahomedan witness' and as such was 'not a system which 
can devolve ipso jure, and without express acceptance, upon a govern-
ment and people of a different faith' (House of Commons 1842: 446).  
The EIC would still administer India and its Mofussil territories for the 
next seventeen years until its dissolution following the Indian Rebellion 
of 1857, but its claim to legal imperium over its inhabitants has already 
vanished long before, paving the way for the string of codifications that 






A longue durée perspective has its inherent limitations. However, it does 
allow for patterns to emerge within a larger chronology which would 
otherwise be easily overshadowed by the detailed analysis of a particular 
event in time. In adopting such a perspective we have sought to put to 
light such a pattern: that the legal basis of British sovereignty in colonial 
India is both jurisprudentially consistent but also irrelevant in relation of 
the legal justification of legal transfers. 
Consistent, in the fact that despite having been the subject of 
different localisations, or more precisely embodiments, sovereignty’s 
legal foundation remained grounded within Common Law theory and the 
continuous division between the sovereign and the "commonwealth" 
granting the former its political legal capacity in the absence of an 
abstract state with a fictitious legal personality. Subsequently, the EIC 
was never—in the legal sense—sovereign in India. However, such 
continuum debunks the idea that British colonial expansion in India was 
made in 'a fit of absent-mindedness' as Lord Palmerston once put it.  
Irrelevant, for the legal basis for legislation—and thus the possibility 
of substantive legal transfers—did not lie within the sovereign but with 
the "commonwealth" of the "nation" represented through parliament. It 
is this particular position within the English legal framework that the EIC 
ventured to transpose in India, but which would ultimately fail when 
taken over by the British parliament. 
Further, the pattern that emerged offers insight into the early history 
of Anglo-Indian law. It tends to show—or rather confirm—that despite 
its claim to administer local laws, or invent an entirely novel legal system 
as the embodiment of the Indian "commonwealth", the EIC continued in 
fact to heavily rely and project English Common Law concepts, whose 
evolution where furthermore not based on its confrontation to Indian 
realities, but rather mimicked the changes occurring within the British 
Isles.
Endnotes 
1 This is mainly shown by the fact that the King could be legally seized to a "use" of another (1461 
I Edw. 4 C. 1; S.R. ii, 380, at 386), acting as any other feudal lord at the time.  
2 The King 'has two capacities, for he has two bodies, the one whereof is a body natural, consisting 
of natural members as every other man has […] the other is a body politic, and the members 
thereof are his subjects, and he and his subjects together compose the corporation' (Willion v. 
Berkley 1560, 75 E.R. 339, at 355).   
3 The author is referring to the demise of the crown, when all delegations granted from the 
monarch cease upon his death. Despite the advent of term 'crown' distinguishing more clearly the 





                                                                                                                                                                       
political body of the King from his natural one, the fact that both are still incorporated within a 
physical person does not allow the 'immortality' or the continuity the abstract concept of the state 
conveys.   
4 Letter from Great Mogul to King James, 8th August 1618 (Foster 1899: 559). Roe whilst being on 
an official diplomatic mission will also receive payment for his services by the EIC, provided he 
offers information to the latter concerning his dealings at the Mughal Court (The Company’s 
agreement with Roe, In ibid: 547-9), whilst the King himself enjoins Roe to 'use all the means you 
can to advance the Trade of the East India Company […] which being the main scope of your 
employment' (The King’s instructions to Roe, 29th December 1614, In ibid: 551-3).    
5 The agreements concluded with the Surat authorities, B., 1623 (Foster 1908: 309-12). 
6 Reported by George Wilcox (first President of the Court), In: Fawcett 1934: 54.  
7 Letter to Bombay dated 28th Jul. 1686 (cited in Fawcett 1934: 132). 
8  Plan for the administration of justice, In: Monckton Jones 1918: 324-6. 
9 Letter dated 6th January 1773, In ibid: 327. 
10 Warren Hastings to Lord Mansfield, 21 March 1774, in: Berriedale Keith, 1922: vol. 1, 61. 
11 Being a series of Regulations adopted for the administration of justice under the governorship 
of Charles Cornwallis – a compendium of the latter have been reproduced In Colebrook 1807).  
12 Minute of the rights of zemindars and talookdars, recorded on the proceedings of the 
Governement in the revenue department, 2nd April 1788, In Harrington 1866: 4. 
13 The case revolved around an inheritance dispute between Nauderah Begum, the widow of a 
Company Servant living in Patna, and the latter’s nephew, Behadar Beg. The case was first 
adjudicated by Muslim judges within a "Company Court" who, following Islamic succession law, 
decided in favour of the nephew, granting him three quarters of the estate of his uncle, whilst 
Nauderah Begum was only granted a quarter as a Quranic heir. Nauderah Begum, unhappy with 
the result, fled to Calcutta, where she brought up the case to the Supreme Court suing both 
Behadar Beg, but also the Muslim judges for lacking jurisdiction. While the latter were arrested, 
Nauderah Begum was granted the entire estate of her deceased husband under the justification of 
'nature, justice and common sense'.  
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